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It is more than surprising how much the professional political and economic literature dealing with the 
relations between the European Union (EU) and the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) 
is dominated by an evident imbalance. On the one hand, there is a rapidly growing number of 
publications on specific but not necessarily strategically important issues, from the impact of trade 
policy measures through special areas of cooperation to an overall assessment of the Association  
Agreements. On the other, there is rather few evidence of different strategic approaches to the future of 
the European pattern of security, political, economic and social cooperation. This imbalance is the 
more striking because the history of EU-CEECs relations in the last years have provided an 
unprecedented dynamism of bilateral relations which has definitely not come to an end by the signing 
of Association Agreements (AAs). 
 
It was less than seven years ago that, after a decade of deadlock, the joint declaration between the 
European Communities and the late CMEA was signed. This document opened the way for trade and 
cooperation agreements, with very modest potential improvements in real terms. The dramatic 
transformation of CEECs made these agreements obsolete practically overnight. The granting of GSP 
treatment, the starting of the PHARE programme and the signing of an AA followed within the next 
two years. As a result, all CEECs have substantially upgraded their position on the pyramid of trade 
preferences granted by Brussels to third countries (Inotai, 1994a). Once the AA was ratified (February 
1994), Hungary and Poland almost immediately applied for full membership (April 1994), and other 
transforming countries are expected to follow this way soon. 
 
Moreover, substantial changes have characterized the attitude of the EU, as well. Still, the AA does not 
contain any EU commitment to future full membership of any of the associated countries. Just the 
opposite, and very much against the interests of the CEECs, the EU has clearly stated that there was no 
linkage between present association and future membership. One year later, the EU summit at 
Edinburgh, and even more, the next one in Copenhagen have acknowledged the effort of the CEECs to 
become full member, if and when basic political and economic criteria, to be set by Brussels, were 
fulfilled (Inotai, 1994). The German presidency (second half of 1994) qualified future membership of 
the CEECs as one of the main priorities. Therefore, clear criteria for joining, further opening of the EU 
markets and the intensification of political dialogue were considered the most important policy steps to 
be made. Only three years after the refusal of potential future membership, the Essen summit in 
December 1994 has already fully taken into account the Eastern enlargement of the EU. Any more the 
question was about membership of the CEECs in the EU but about when and how, "only". In the 
meantime, associate membership in the Western European Union (WEU), the political and security 
body of the integration could materialize, and a comprehensive network of "structured dialogue" has 
started in several integration-relevant areas (foreign and security policy, domestic and legal issues, 
education, environment, research, telecommunications, etc.).  
 Partly, this dynamism has been incorporated into the time schedule of the EU for the next years. 
Negotiations on membership may start after the EFTA enlargement (January 1995) and the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC, in 1996 and possible also in 1997). Although, except for Malta 
and Cyprus, clear EU commitment to start negotiation has not been made up to now, but some CEECs 
are firmly insisting on beginning with these talks in the second half of 1997 or in early 1998, in the 
worst case.  
 
This is, however, only the in-built dynamism into the process of decision making and institutional 
reforming of the EU. Substantial impetus can also be expected both from the CEECs and the internal 
developments within the EU in the next years. One has to be blind not to recognize that the dramatic 
changes in Europe which started in 1989 did not come to an end by 1995. Just the opposite, it is now 
Western Europe where changes, both for domestic and external reasons, are expected to become more 
pronounced. Evidently, we do not know the exact volume and direction of changes which are expected 
to shape the future of Europe. It is, however, obvious that the Western European political, security, 
economic and social status quo, as established in the late fifties and early sixties and based on a firmly 
divided Europe cannot be maintained. 
 
This paper focuses on some of the fundamental future issues. Thus it does not deal with achievements 
and shortcomings of EU-CEECs relations as reflected by bilateral developments in the last years. More 
importantly, it tries to address the dynamics of developments and some of the major challenges 
European integration is likely to face well before the end of the century. Divided into eight chapters, 
the analysis starts with the adjustment criteria preceding CEECs membership (chapter I), to be 
followed by developments and special interests in sensitive areas, including the question of financial 
transfers (chapters II and III). Chapter IV looks at intermediate or alternative proposals to full 
membership. Special chapters are dedicated to the timing of membership and to the question whether 
accession should happen individually or in a group approach (chapters V and VI). Chapter VII 
examines the future of intra-European balance, while the last chapter offers some conclusions. 
 
 
I. The Development of Adjustment Criteria 
 
 
1. The Copenhagen criteria 
At least partially urged by the Central European associated countries (ex-Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
Poland), the EU, at its Copenhagen summit in the summer of 1993, has formulated some conditions to 
be fulfilled by the would-be members. This list, including stabilization of democracy and law; 
readiness to adopt the acquis communautaire, the establishment of an effective market economy and 
the adoption and fulfilment of the convergence aims of the Maastricht treaty, covers a wide but rather 
"soft" range of political, legal and economic conditions. 
 
For several reasons, this set of criteria is an unprecedented step of the EU in comparison with earlier 
enlargements. For the first time, specific conditions have been imposed on acceding countries. The 
Treaty of Rome laid down only one condition: the entrant nation must be European. So the 
Copenhagen decision, in fact, discriminates against the transitional countries (Inotai, 1994b). Of course, 
there were prerequisites in the previous enlargements, too, but these only affected the conditions of 
accession, not the starting of negotiations and the very chances of joining. In this context, the question 
can be formulated whether the system of criteria can be considered as an instrument to facilitate 
membership, or, on the contrary, as a substantial barrier to future accession. In other words, does this 
concept help sustain the dynamics of European developments or, on the opposite, it tries to slow down, 
and if possible, even stop the dynamic forces of European reorganization set free after the collapse of 
the Berlin wall and of communism in Europe? 
 
The Copenhagen set of criteria indicates the EU's interest in shifting future enlargements from political 
pressures towards economic merits. In fact, both Mediterranean enlargements were predominantly 
characterized by political motives. Paradoxically, after the collapse of the Yalta-based European 
security system, Brussels does not experience any short-term political interest in favour of the Eastern enlargement. On the contrary, in the absence of such pressure, it tends to concentrate on the economic 
performance of newcomers. 
 
In addition, and for at least two reasons, the associated CEECs are in a worse initial position than 
former applicants. First, they have to adjust themselves to a flexible, or even more, to an unpredictable 
EU. In consequence all criteria may be changing according to the changing situation and interests of 
Brussels and the member countries. Second, the integration standard of the EU is much higher today 
than it was a decade ago when the  Mediterranean enlargement occurred. As a result, less developed 
CEECs, burdened with burning transformation problems should carry out a successful adjustment to a 
new quality of integration.  
 
Last but not least, there are serious questions regarding the measurement of "integration maturity" as 
well. Should this maturity level be measured on the basis of virtual economic performance (static 
survey) or, more importantly, on the basis of the speed and quality of the adjustment process (dynamic 
assessment)? And, even if the first, static criteria applies, should macroeconomic adjustment or 
microeconomic developments be considered as more important? How can third country performance 
be compared with that of member countries, if the latter enjoy a very special status, from free market 
access to substantial financial transfers, while the former are largely deprived of these opportunities 
until they become full members. 
 
2. The enlargement capability of the EU  
Although the enlargement capability of the EU is one of the Copenhagen criteria, it has to be dealt with 
separately because it is just this factor that may substantially influence the future shape of Europe. 
 
It has to be stressed that the viability of the European integration does not only depend on an Eastern 
enlargement. The original architecture of the EU was created for six to ten countries, more or less on 
the same level of economic development and political culture. Its profound restructuring has been 
overdue even without any future Eastern enlargement. Therefore the new integration framework is not 
(only) a precondition for further enlargement but a pressing requirement of survival for the "European 
anchor" of the international economy. 
 
First, the EU has to respond to serious international challenges, as changing pattern of competitiveness, 
regionalization and globalization trends and technological developments.  
 
Second, Brussels has to find an adequate answer to the dynamics of European processes. This, 
however, does not mean a shift in emphasis or another mix of policy instruments. On the contrary, a 
fundamental rethinking of the whole concept of integration and Europe is required. The decades-long 
status quo mentality based on the protection of Western values against an imperialistic Soviet empire 
should give way to an active, offensive and future-oriented attitude (Weidenfeld, 1995). 
 
Third, most of the member countries are plagued by an "European disease", characteristic of the ex-
socialist transforming economies as well. Two-digit unemployment, exploding budget deficits and 
state debts, obsolete agricultural and industrial structures, serious limits to finance the already achieved 
level of social welfare and a rapidly aging population can be mentioned as some of the outstanding 
negative factors. 
 
Fourth, and most unfortunately, these external and internal challenges affect the EU at a time where, 
mainly as a result of internal developments, the integration itself is facing new problems. The concept 
of integration developed in the Maastricht treaty seems to be outdated under the present conditions in 
Europe. More importantly, the integration pattern based on priorities of the fifties and sixties (e.g. iron 
and steel community, customs union and agricultural self-supply) cannot efficiently answer the 
challenges at the turn of the century. In addition, as recent referenda tell, popular support for a large 
Union, as conceived by Brussels and some politicians from member countries, is much less than 
desired ("democracy deficit").  
Finally, for the first time in its history, the EU is facing an increasing balance-of-power crisis due to 
German reunification, EFTA enlargement, Central and Eastern European association and highly unpredictable Russian developments, all of them part and parcel of the emerging dynamics of 
European politics and economics. 
 
The capability of the EU to further enlargement has to be assessed in this framework. Key importance 
will be attached to the handling of new "fault lines", as the definition of the "finalité" of the European 
integration, the managing of the North-South conflict or the control of the internal balance of the 
Union (Dauderstädt and Lippert, 1995). The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) is expected to deal 
with some if these issues. It is, however, unlikely that it will be able to develop a completely new 
pattern of European integration. It has to be noted that there is no contractually fixed linkage between 
its success and Eastern enlargement. The only link, at the moment, is that negotiations on further 
enlargement will not be initiated before the IGC.  
 
3. The forthcoming White Book 
Still under German presidency, Brussels has promised to produce a White Book containing more 
elaborated conditions of membership 
for new applicants. This set of criteria is expected to be published shortly. Preliminary reports indicate 
that the experts will not be able to go beyond setting general and not binding conditions. For political 
and economic reasons, no recommendations will be provided how applicants should go from their 
present status towards full membership, and how the EU would support this process. Neither a clear 
timetable will be offered (Altmann, Andreff and Fink, 1995). Although the EU has already 
acknowledged the fundamental differences among CEECs, no "geographic sequencing" of an Eastern 
enlargement will be envisaged. In sum, the underlying philosophy of the White Book will remain the 
old one. It will contain adjustment requirements for applicants without taking into consideration the 
changing European dynamics and claim for a mutual adjustment process coupled with EU support 
during the period of preparation for accession (Inotai, 1995). 
 
4. New obstacles to membership? 
To be sure, none of the transforming economies is ready for full membership at the moment. However, 
most of them have made substantial progress in the last years, and their adjustment capability and 
transformation dynamics proved incomparably higher than that of Western Europe. In some areas they 
are at least on the level of some EU members (Altmann and Ochmann, 1995). In other, mainly 
economic areas their adjustment performance has been overshadowed by the transformation crisis. 
However, as the old problems fade away, a more competitive economic structure is emerging at least 
in the Central European countries. Industrial restructuring is on the way, the share of agriculture is 
decreasing, the service sector is rapidly progressing. Intra-industry trade is growing dynamically, and 
its share in the CEECs exports is already higher than in that of some member countries. Also their 
favourable human factor endowment is coming to the fore. 
 
Looking at these trends, it may be increasingly difficult to argue against their membership because of 
major political or economic reasons. Such an attitude is being made even less acceptable as some of 
the CEECs seem to be more in line with adjustment to the EU principles than some of the member 
countries are. If, thus, Eastern enlargement should nevertheless be postponed, new ideas have to be 
found in order to explain why the CEECs would be still not able to join the EU. 
 
These barriers are taking already shape in various forms. According to the most recent French position, 
new entrants should immediately cope with the prescriptions of the Social Charter and with the 
environmental rules. Other ideas include the examination of the exchange rate in the CEECs, the 
elimination of any major (even temporary) gap between productivity and wage growth, and a linkage 
between foreign direct investments and employment in the capital exporting countries.  
 
It is not difficult to identify the common roots of all of these measures, which is a growing fear of 
competitiveness throughout Western Europe, but particularly in the less prepared member countries of 
the EU. In consequence, the impression of experts from the CEECs is getting support, that adjustment 
criteria have not been formulated in order to fulfil them but in order to maintain the doors of the Union 
closed to the transforming economies as long as possible. 
  
II. Sensitive Issues on the Way to Full Membership 
 
 
1. Free trade 
Except for agriculture, the complete elimination of trade barriers is foreseen by the Association 
Agreements. In a ten year long and asymmetric process tariffs and non-tariff barriers have to be 
abolished on both sides. It is generally considered that free trade in industrial products belongs to the 
hard core of criteria for membership. At the same time, little attention has been paid how sensitive this 
issue may become as a consequence of economic and social developments that cannot be fully ruled 
out. 
 
The associated countries may be challenged by two major adverse developments. First, the process of 
asymmetric elimination of trade barriers approaches its second stage, in which the CEECs will have to 
dismantle the still-existing restrictions. In other words, after 1995 to 1997 a "reversed asymmetry" will 
be built up, where the transforming economies will have to accelerate their process of trade 
liberalization, including most of the sensitive areas. For various reasons, this is a more difficult task for 
the transforming economies than for the EU. Average tariffs are generally higher in the CEECs than in 
the EU. Therefore the impact of tariff dismantling is expected to be more substantial for domestic 
production than in the case of the EU. In addition, and parallel to the global tariff reduction process, 
the EU developed a highly efficient "secondary wall of protection" consisting of a jungle of technical 
norms, environmental, veterinary and sanitary prescriptions, etc. Such a non-tariff protection hardly 
exists in any of the CEECs. Therefore, without taking quick and similar policy measures, the 
elimination of tariffs would result in a much more vulnerable situation for Central and Eastern 
European producers then for their EU counterparts. This vulnerability is further exacerbated by the fact 
that, as of 2001, free trade would cover 96 per cent of EU exports to the CEECs, but only about 70 to 
80 per cent of the CEECs exports to the EU, for agricultural products are not included.  
 
One has to be increasingly aware of the political and socio-psychological repercussions which have 
been emerging most recently. After the first years of overhasty trade liberalization in an extremely 
adverse economic situation plagued by the collapse of the Eastern markets and the dramatic shrinking 
of domestic demand, the transforming economies are now experiencing a growing pressure of 
protectionist lobbies consisting of domestic producers and foreign-owned firms located in the region as 
well (Inotai, 1994a). 
 
Secondly, temporary asymmetry in bilateral trade relations was not able to produce a sustainable trade 
surplus for the CEECs. After an initial boom of exports, due to a number of domestic and external 
factors, imports from the EU started to grow much more dynamically than exports to the EU. Most 
importantly, the higher level of economic development, much stronger bargaining position, financial 
solidity, better marketing methods and generally the competitive strength of EU companies have more 
than compensated the initial(ly expected) impact of asymmetric trade liberalization. In other words, the 
"development asymmetry" proved stronger than temporary and rather selective "trade asymmetry". 
The Western European recession of 1993 has given a special impetus to this adverse development, as it 
boosted EU exports and slowed down imports. 
 
The inevitable consequence was a rapidly growing trade deficit of all associated CEECs with the EU. 
While between 1989 and 1993 the EU has accumulated a five-year trade deficit of more than ECU 205 
bn in its trade with non-EU countries, there were two bilateral trade relations in which the EU could 
register a trade surplus. Beside the Mediterranean, characterized by traditional EU surplus, it was the 
trade with the Visegrád Group which helped improve the EU's trade balance by more than ECU 7 bn 
between 1991 and 1993 only. As a result, the sustainability of trade liberalization crucially depends on 
the capacity of the transforming economies to finance growing trade deficits with the EU. Temporary 
or lasting balance-of-payments problems, at least partially caused by the growing imbalance of trade 
with the EU could slow down or even stop the process of trade liberalization stipulated in the 
Association Agreements. Under some circumstances, this could be interpreted by Brussels as a lack of 
"EU maturity" of some CEECs.  
Simultaneously, sensitive areas of trade relations can also be identified on the EU side. The still very 
restrictive market access for agricultural products of the CEECs is just one example. It cannot 
completely ruled out that the rapidly growing competitiveness of the CEECs in selected areas, would 
increase the protectionist pressure within the EU as well. Acute tensions on the labour market of 
several EU countries, or real or alleged implications of adverse economic developments on essential 
political processes can further reduce the EU's readiness for maintaining free trade with the 
transforming countries. 
 
Another factor which may decrease the EU's interest in Eastern enlargement can be the temporary 
shrinking of the CEECs' import market as their balance-of-payments situation deteriorates. The 
sensitivity of future trade relations could substantially be reduced if the EU recognized the necessity of 
financing the natural "modernization deficit" at least in the more progressing CEECs. In the next years, 
all CEECs will require huge investments in order to create a modern production and export structure. 
A large part of the investment goods will be purchased abroad, and there is little doubt that the EU 
(and foreign companies located in the EU) will be the basic supplier. According to international 
experience, in the first years of economic modernization a rapidly widening trade gap can hardly be 
avoided. Restrictions on the exports of available (agricultural) commodities make this problem more 
serious. Assuming a high efficiency of investments and an export-oriented economic policy in the 
CEECs, this gap can be narrowed or even closed in the medium term. It is, however, by far not clear, 
how the emerging "modernization deficit" will be financed in some of the most critical years of 
transformation.  
 
2. Adjustment to the acquis communautaire 
The second hard core of future membership is the acceptance of a constantly increasing package of EU 
rules and regulations. Some of the CEECs have already started this adjustment process and have been 
integrating the EU rules into their national legislation. Nevertheless, legal adjustment, for several 
reasons, cannot be completed before membership. 
 
First, none of the present member countries was able to prepare itself fully for membership before 
accession. In all cases, there were and still are important derogations which enabled both the new 
member and the EU to gradual adjustment. Taking into account the development gap between the EU 
and the CEECs, and the sensitivity threshold of the latter burdened with the unique tasks of 
transformation, the difficulties of the adjustment process become manifest. Therefore a clear medium-
term strategy, elaborated jointly by the applicants and Brussels, would be needed. 
 
Second: part of the acquis communautaire, the so-called primary laws, can only be implemented once a 
country has become member of the EU. The whole package of the common agricultural policy belongs 
to this area. 
 
Third: the EU itself is in a constant change with unpredictable outcome. It would be a serious mistake 
to make a sometimes economically and socially costly adjustment to something which will be changed 
before the CEECs may become members of the Union. 
 
3. Agriculture 
While most experts do not devote special attention to the sensitivity of trade relations and of legal 
adjustment, there is a widespread consensus that agriculture will be one of, if not the most sensitive 
area which could hinder or substantially delay the Eastern enlargement of the EU. Of course, there are 
substantial differences among the individual CEECs. At the moment, only Poland and Hungary are 
meaningful exporters of agricultural goods, while agriculture is not a major negotiation issue for the 
Czech Republic. 
 
For the first time after 1973 when Ireland joined the integration, the accession of most CEECs 
challenges the producers of continental commodities. These countries happen to be the most influential 
members of the EU who have not only largely benefitted from the common agricultural policy (CAP) 
but consider the maintenance of this system crucial for their domestic political balance as well.   
Although it is generally acknowledged that the present system of agricultural support cannot be 
maintained, and both budgetary problems of the Union and international obligations deriving from the 
Uruguay Round documents make a reform of the CAP unavoidable. However, even the most radical 
transformation plans, vehemently opposed by influential lobbies within the EU, fall considerably short 
of the transformation which would be needed to absorb the expected impacts of an Eastern 
enlargement.  
A further problem consists in the fundamental behaviour of the  
EU which, as some experts in the CEECs have always feared, has considered the CEECs as an 
additional market for highly subsidized EU agricultural goods and not as a low-cost supplier of EU 
markets. In fact, the most dramatic developments reflecting the most extensive "reversed asymmetry" 
took place in the agricultural trade between the EU and the CEECs in the last five years. At present, 
except for Hungary, all CEECs are net agricultural importers in their bilateral trade relations with the 
EU. Also Hungary's traditionally substantial trade surplus started to shrink rapidly. In addition, 
subsidized EU exports and food aid packages to the successor states of the Soviet Union have largely 
devastated traditional agricultural markets of the associated CEECs. 
 
Looking at the present situation in the agriculture of the transforming economies, the EU's fear of 
"Eastern competition" 
can hardly be justified. For several reasons, agriculture became the sickest sector in all CEECs. The 
share of agriculture in the generation of GDP fell dramatically, from about 15 to 20 per cent to less 
than 10 per cent, which is not higher than in the less developed EU countries. Similar tendencies can 
be observed in the pattern of the labour force. Of course, some CEECs, notably Poland and Hungary, 
still have a substantial production and export potential, but some of the basic preconditions, as efficient 
production structure, money, technology, marketing organizations are missing. Therefore, as seen 
today, the real problem of an Eastern enlargement is not so much how to integrate a highly competitive 
Eastern agriculture into the system of the CAP, but how to finance those regions which, as a 
consequence of declining or already eliminated agricultural production are becoming poorer and 
poorer.  
 
Most experts are convinced that a sound and competitive Central and Eastern European agriculture 
would cost less to the EU than a devastated one. Calculations have to consider not only direct 
agricultural impacts but also the impact of agricultural production on several other areas (financing of 
imports from the EU, employment, regional development, political stability, etc.). Starting from such 
an assessment, a coordinated plan should be designed in order to combine the restructuring of 
agriculture in the EU with restructuring in selected CEECs. In this way, the costs of adjustment could 
be substantially reduced and some of the essential barriers to future membership cleared. In addition, 
the impact of an Eastern enlargement on the agricultural budget of the EU would be moderate. 
 
4. Manpower 
The highly sensitive issue of the free flow of labour has not been regulated by the Association 
Agreements, for this topic still belongs to the competence of the member countries. Therefore, the flow 
of labour has to be settled in bilateral negotiations with the individual EU countries. At the moment, 
only Germany (and the newcomer Austria) has signed such a document, and even in this case, the 
yearly quota of Central and Eastern European labour to be employed in Germany is decreasing.  
It can be predicted that the issue of free flow of labour will be one of the fundamental areas where the 
EU will apply a long period of derogation, as it was the case with the (second) Mediterranean 
enlargement, too. This restriction will, however, be differently felt in the individual CEECs. The 
problem is much more important for Poland and Romania than for the Czech Republic or Hungary.  
 
There are two special aspects of this issue, however, which matter for all CEECs. On the one hand, the 
first stage of Eastern enlargement may occur at a time of two-digit Western (and also Eastern) 
European unemployment. On the other hand, labour problems are not confined to unskilled or low-
skilled labour, as it was the case with the guest workers coming from Southern Europe in the sixties 
and seventies. More importantly, the real competitive pressure is expected to come from the (highly) skilled labour with clear competitive advantages both in their wage level and, in several cases, also in 
their "skill flexibility". 
 
It is not unlikely that EU restrictions on the free flow of labour will further strengthen the flow of 
capital to the CEECs not only in traditional but also in new, skill-intensive sectors, as the wage (and 
productivity) differences are becoming more manifest in the latter. This could contribute to accelerated 
economic development and quick adjustment to the EU more than the reinvention of a new "guest 
worker system". What is not yet clear is the future answer of EU governments and trade unions to the 
increasing flow of capital, and with it, the (alleged) "export of employment" to the CEECs. High social 
and environmental standards, as mentioned in the first chapter, are an early indication of the potential 




III. Financial transfers 
 
 
At least based on most recent literature on the possibilities of and the limits to an Eastern enlargement, 
all difficulties listed above are dwarfed by the financial needs of such a decision. 
 
Beyond any doubt, all CEECs, in their present situation, would be net beneficiaries of the currently 
working EU transfer mechanism. Most of them would be entitled to get money for their agriculture, 
and all of them would be net receivers of the structural, cohesion and regional funds. 
 
It can easily be understood that the present member countries who are net beneficiaries of the system 
strongly protest against any kind of enlargement which would deteriorate their present position and 
hurt any of their vested interests. They would oppose any enlargement which would lead to any kind of 
redistribution of the existing funds. There is nothing new in it, the same had happened with earlier 
enlargements as well.  
 
The really new development is that the mechanisms which were able to remedy the above problems in 
earlier periods, do not seem very likely to work in the second half of the nineties. First, the net 
contributors to the EU budget are not ready to commit themselves to "recapitalize" the existing funds 
and create extra resources for the CEECs, without hurting the vested interests of other net beneficiaries 
of the system. Just the opposite is happening, for most of them would like to reduce their contribution, 
as they struggle with serious internal imbalances. Neither their high or even growing budgetary deficit 
and an exploding state debt, nor the strong adjustment criteria to be fulfilled in order to become 
member of Maastricht-Europe allow a meaningful scope of financial activities. The most important 
country which is strongly interested in Eastern enlargement has been struggling for years with the 
astronomical costs of German unification. Second, earlier enlargements were regularly accompanied 
by the creation of a new fund tailored to the applicant(s), in order to avoid conflicts which could have 
been caused by a major redistribution of previously committed resources. At present, no such an 
initiative seems to be financially feasible, even if it were not difficult to find a number of justified 
"labels" for it ("modernization fund", "pre-accession fund", "physical and human infrastructure fund", 
"stability fund", "regional development fund", etc.). 
 
The situation is complicated by three additional factors, which may increase the total costs of Eastern 
enlargement. First, there is a widespread fear in the EU of the unexpectedly strong competitiveness of 
the CEECs in a wide range of commodity markets. At a time of high-level unemployment and 
substantial social and political resistance to structural changes in the EU, influential interest groups 
will do their best to get some kind of compensation as a consequence of Eastern enlargement. Second, 
also the currently net beneficiary member countries will present their bill, as they have already done it 
shortly after the signing of the Association Agreement and the coming into force of the PHARE 
programme. In fact, they have got several times more additional money than what has been envisaged 
for the financing of the transformation in the CEECs. Finally, the Essen meeting has provided a first 
indication of an emerging political struggle between advocates of an Eastern enlargement and those preferring contacts with the (Southern) Mediterranean. The growing fear of Islamic fundamentalism 
and, more directly, the interest in maintaining the increasingly delicate balance between France and 
Germany may require substantial "political compensation" expressed in financial terms for North 
Africa in exchange for any Eastern enlargement. Summing up, the total costs of an Eastern 
enlargement may turn out much higher than the resources to be virtually directed towards the applicant 
countries. 
 
But there is an extremely large gap also in the calculation of the direct costs themselves. Figures 
fluctuate from ECU 18 bn to over ECU 100 bn annually. It is not difficult to discover political 
considerations behind the calculations. The higher the amounts are, the more the experts try to point 
out why an Eastern enlargement is impossible or at least unwanted. Although most of the unreasonably 
high figures turn out to be the result of serious miscalculations, and they may be even withdrawn. 
However, once published they start their independent life, and will have a lasting impact on the 
mentality of policy makers. Both for economic and political reasons, and both in the interest of the EU 
and in that of the CEECs, it would be highly recommendable to rule out politically motivated 
"scientific approaches". 
 
Any realistic assessment of the potential costs of an Eastern enlargement has to take into consideration 
the following elements.  
 
First, all calculations based on the present transfer mechanism of the EU are exaggerated because none 
of the CEECs believes in the financial capability of the EU to extend this system without any major 
reform to the new entrants.  
 
Second, an assessment of the economic performance of the CEECs cannot be realistically based on old 
figures, as it often happens with their agricultural potential based on the late eighties. Neither can all 
present figures considered realistic, because such an approach ignores the development which is 
expected to take place before full membership materializes. In this context, per capita GDP, as a key 
indicator of entitlement for transfers from the regional and the cohesion funds, has to be mentioned. To 
be sure, at present all CEECs are entitled to such transfers, but some of them may get out of this 
framework in a shorter then expected period, because GDP per capita, as expressed in ECU terms does 
not only depend on GDP growth rates but, sometimes to a larger extent, on the appreciation of the 
national currency, a general consequence of economic recovery and structural upgrading.  
    
Third, there is no plan that would envisage a "bloc accession" of all CEECs to the EU. Therefore, all 
reliable calculations have to make it clear that the individual CEECs will be entitled to a substantially 
different amounts of net resource transfer from the EU budget. Therefore, any overall estimate or the 
frequently used "basket principle" is hurting the interests of the individual countries, in general, and the 
interests of those who are expected to become full members sooner, and would cause less resource 
diversion than others, in particular.  
 
Fourth, no comparison can be made between the financial requirements of German unification and the 
resources to be needed by an Eastern enlargement. The CEECs did not become part of another country, 
they did not give up their national currency, and, most importantly, they very well know that they 
cannot reach West German living standard in the foreseeable future. For economic, political and 
psychological reasons, the financing of their modernization is much less expensive. Neither can the 
CEECs be compared with the financial requirements of Russia or the Ukraine. 
 
According to realistic calculations, Poland would need an annual net transfer of about ECU 5 to 7 bn, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia ECU 1.5 to 2 bn each, and Hungary ECU 2 to 3 bn. Thus the 
Visegrád Group would require EU financing of ECU 10 to 16 bn annually. This would increase the 
annual budget of the EU (about ECU 70 bn) by 15 to 23 per cent, provided that the Visegrád countries 
could join the EU at the same time. Between 1993 and 1997, the four less developed EU member 
countries, with the same level of population as the Visegrád Group (about 64 mn) get an annual 
transfer of ECU 18 bn from the structural and cohesion fund only (Nötzold, 1994). The calculated total 
transfer to the four Central European countries would be 60 to 90 per cent of this sum. Finally, a one-percent growth of the EU means a GDP increase by about ECU 67 bn. In the next years, a rapid and 
sustainable growth of about 3 per cent can be predicted. The establishment of a special fund to be 
devoted to the financing of Central Europe's economic modernization would need less than a quarter of 
a one-percent economic growth within the EU. 
 
The timing of the financial transfers is extremely important. The CEECs would need this money earlier 
than they may become members of the EU. The financing of the pre-accession period is crucial for 
several reasons. Such a mechanism could partially finance the emerging modernization costs and 
maintain the momentum of economic and social transformation and its political support. At the same 
time, it would be a clear sign that the EU is really committed in an Eastern enlargement. Most 
importantly, however, such a fund could contribute to the financing of those industrial and 
infrastructural investments which would substantially enhance the development level of the CEECs, a 
precondition for efficient membership on both sides. In addition, the financing of a successful 
preparation would decrease the amount of transfer that would be necessary following accession. 
 
In order to implement such a policy, some basic strategic decisions have to be taken. The EU has to 
answer the fundamental question, whether the financing of modernization or that of constant 
instabilities would cost more. The first option has a better chance to create sustainable security and 
development,  increase European competitiveness on the global scale, while, certainly, it would also 
strengthen adjustment pressure in Western Europe. In turn, a "strategy" based on repeated damage 
limitation requires much more money, without eliminating the roots of instability, and, more 
importantly, without creating the "grass-root cells" of modernization. The dynamics of European 
development will not allow to delay very much this decision between financing (painful) 
modernization or financing a minimum level of social welfare promising short-term stability. The EU's 
answer to this challenge will not only influence the future of Eastern enlargement but, at least to the 
same extent, the future of the EU as well. 
 
 
IV. Transitory Concepts Between Association and     Membership 
 
 
The preceding chapters have pointed out some of the most sensitive areas of the adjustment and 
preparation process both in the transforming countries and within the EU. It is not surprising that, 
taking into account these difficulties, a wide range of suggestions has been developed in order to 
bridge over the time gap between the present status and future objectives. All of these 
recommendations are based on the common assumption that the European dynamics will not produce 
any dramatic and sudden shift in the current balance-of-power pattern, and, more importantly, Russian 
political developments will remain sufficiently predictable and under control. In other words, there will 
be no reason for an emergency access to the EU of the CEECs. 
 
Practically all such suggestions have been formulated in the EU. In turn, the associated countries 
consider a direct linkage between association and full membership and treat the association agreements 
as a stepping stone towards future membership. Consequently, they are rather suspicious regarding 
plans splitting or threatening to split this linkage. 
 
One of the general Western European argument is that the transforming economies have to reach the 
average level of the EU 
before becoming full member. This has, however, never been the case in any integration scheme, and 
particularly not in the EU. The argument has to be reversed. All applicants would like to become full 
member of a more developed and prosperous integration because they consider membership as an 
instrument to achieve a higher level of development. In the same line goes the concept of regional 
integration preceding membership in the EU (see Chapter VI in more detail). Also Baldwin's idea of an 
"Association of Association Agreements" (Baldwin, 1994) can be refuted on the same grounds. 
 
The second set of transitory measures tries to split economic and security issues. This is particularly 
manifest in French approaches, including the Balladur stability pact. From a short-sighted Western European point of view this concept is understandable, for the EU would like to achieve the highest 
level of security without the need to co-finance the economic modernization process in the CEECs. 
This attempt is based on the fatally erroneous assumption that stability in Europe can be sustained 
without fundamental economic modernization at least in Central Europe. As long as the latter fails to 
be achieved no lasting stability on the continent can be created (Inotai, 1994c). 
 
The third approach offers full membership in some areas (mainly in those which are of key importance 
for the EU, as security and political cooperation), but exclude the new members from other areas 
which would be vitally important for them. Membership without participation in the common 
agricultural policy or membership without financial transfer are the two most important suggestions. It 
goes without saying that such an approach is unacceptable for the CEECs. 
 
There are also plans which recognize the importance of economic issues for the CEECs but try to 
manage them in frameworks different from the EU. In this context, membership in the OECD, the 
creation of a new EFTA or the joining to the European Economic Area can be mentioned. Although 
some of these frameworks, mainly that of the OECD is an important policy issue, and may even be a 
precondition for EU membership, they do not substitute the EU in two basic areas: agricultural trade 
and financial transfer. 
 
Finally, the CEECs do not share the idea which emphasizes the importance of the European cultural 
identity and a common value system without supporting the economic modernization in the 
transforming economies.  
 
At least at the first glance, there is a more common view that the way from the present association 
status to full membership in all aspects will be a long period. It is, however, extremely important what 
section of this long preparation period will be implemented before membership, and what section will 
be carried out by the transforming economies as new members of the EU. All new entrants, including 
the highly developed ones, have got long derogation periods, and also the EU needs some time for 
adjustment to integrate the new members fully. It will not be different for the CEECs either. Even 
more, some adjustment tasks can only be implemented once a country is member of the EU (e.g. 
common agricultural policy). 
 
One of the most widespread arguments covers the relation between deepening and widening. Those 
who give priority to deepening argue that only a strong and united EU can provide the necessary 
support for the transforming countries and could absorb the problems that are likely to arise as a result 
of Eastern enlargement. In addition, a premature Eastern enlargement could easily dilute the EU and 
threaten even the already achieved level of integration. This argument is based on the assumption that 
the dynamics of deepening is much stronger than the dynamics of European restructuring. Experience 
gathered in the last years does not prove this hypothesis. If the EU does not consider the new European 
dynamics adequately in its strategic plans, it can easily face tremendous challenges not only from 
outside but also from within the EU, mainly in the form of growing German dissatisfaction with the 
integration. The danger of - at least temporarily - diluting the integration is real, but so is the danger of 
disrupting the Union as well. 
 
From the point of view of the CEECs, those plans of preparation for full membership seem to be 
convenient which are jointly designed by the individual CEECs and the EU. A clearcut pre-accession 
strategy is needed, for this can substantially decrease the costs of enlargement both for the applicant 
and for the old members of the Union. This plan should be gradual in three directions: time, geography 
and contents. In other words, it has to offer a clear timetable spreading from the present situation until 
full membership, integrate the individual CEECs step by step, and contain a list of derogations.  
 
It cannot be ruled out that a feasible modernization plan to be financed by the EU could substantially 
reduce the present pressure on the EU for quick Eastern enlargement. The CEECs look at the EU as 
their economic modernization anchor. However, if they could get most of the resources needed for a 
medium-term modernization strategy (mainly free access to the EU's agricultural market and substantial modernization transfers), perhaps the question of membership could be temporarily 
postponed by some years. 
 
 
V. Is a clear timetable necessary? 
 
 
As long as, however, such an approach lacks reality, the issue of setting a clear timetable for 
membership remains on the agenda.  
 
EU officials have repeatedly refused to identify the exact date of Eastern enlargement. They were not 
ready to make any commitment which could not be fulfilled, either because of the low level of 
adjustment and performance of a CEEC or as a result of the EU's internal problems. In addition, the 
setting of a fixed date could cause political problems. If one date only will be set, there is a danger that 
no differentiation can be made among the CEECs, so that enlargement will only be feasible as a group 
accession. If, however, different dates were given to different countries of the region, the EU could 
easily contribute to further splitting the transforming region, which is definitely not Brussels objective. 
It is obvious that Brussels would like to avoid such traps. 
 
On the other hand, there are powerful arguments in favour of establishing a fixed timetable for future 
membership. It would provide a fundamental political, economic and psychological support to the 
transforming economies, just in one of the most painful periods of transformation. In political terms, 
the consolidation of democracy and the control of nationalistic (and, to a much smaller extent, 
extremist) movements can be mentioned. In economic context, CEEC governments could get support 
against growing pressure by protectionist lobbies. In psychological terms, the way out of the 
transformation crisis badly needs a credible vision. Reaching EU membership could be such a vision.  
 
Not less importantly, a clear timetable could substantially reduce the costs of adjustment to future 
membership on both sides. By establishing a final point, it would create adjustment and cooperation 
pressures on both sides in order to fulfil all necessary requirements before accession takes place. 
Costly and dangerous ex-post adaptations could be largely avoided. Also more room would be 
provided in influencing the reform process of the EU itself. Finally, and according to international 
experience, a fixed date could become a relevant factor of attracting strategic investors from different 
parts of the world. Once potential investors can be sure of the future status of a  (small) country, its 
locational advantages will substantially increase. More foreign direct investment would decrease the 
importance of financial transfers from the EU to the CEECs, as the relevant part of the "modernization 
deficit" could be financed by foreign investors.  
 
Once would-be members are well on the way to full membership, the relevance of the previously fixed 
date is likely to become secondary. The dynamics of the process will be more important than an 
eventual delay of some months or a year in the date of membership. Therefore, setting a date would not 
be counterproductive, if it can generate confidence in future membership and accelerate the process of 
adjustment. 
 
VI. Individual or group accession? 
 
 
Immediately after the unprecedented changes in Central and Eastern Europe, the EU tried to convince 
the transforming countries that they should cooperate first of all among themselves and consider 
(sub)regional integration as a stage in their way towards the EU. Although in a rather "soft" way, 
subregional cooperation has been considered as a precondition for EU membership. 
 
For a number of reasons, the CEECs were unanimously against this approach. It was not only their rich 
and negative experience with the CMEA, the largely competitive and not complementary production 
and export structure, as well as similar macroeconomic problems of the transformation process that 
forced them to reverse the sequencing between subregional and EU integration. Most importantly, they have seen the time coming where, after decades, they would be able to intensify economic relations 
with more developed countries from which a substantial contribution to their several times delayed 
modernization needs has been expected. Also, the pattern and sequencing of subregional and European 
integration has given rise to the not totally unfounded view according to which the EU wanted to limit 
the CEECs' competition in Western Europe by persuading them about the benefits of subregional 
cooperation. 
 
Evidently, subregional cooperation among the CEECs is important. However, economic modernization 
and export-driven growth can only be achieved through a decisive orientation towards the main and 
more developed markets. Similar to experience with successful modernization in East Asia, and partly 
also in Latin America, integration into the EU was given priority over subregional cooperation. The 
latter was considered as an important element of enhancing exports after, and not before, and even less, 
instead of, membership in the EU. Also, intraindustrial trade with EU countries was considered as a 
precondition for the upgrading of subregional cooperation. 
 
Evidently, the EU had justified reasons for treating the CEECs as a bloc, or, at least, as a unit. Its rather 
superficial knowledge of the region, sweeping changes everywhere, the survival of bloc mentality as a 
heritage of the cold war period  and more recently, the EU's self interest in protecting the Western 
European markets against competitive CEECs products provide sufficient arguments in favour of such 
attitude. In a more positive sense, Brussels has also reckoned with the political sensitivity of any effort 
to divide the otherwise rather divided region more openly.  
 
For several years, the EU has always avoided any clear statement on the diversity of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Even when entrepreneurs and politicians became fully aware of the huge differences 
among CEECs, the political rhetoric did not change at all. Today, Brussels is using a double pattern 
consisting of bloc mentality on the one hand, and of a very cautious distinctive approach, on the other. 
The EU very well knows that the region cannot be officially declared split. At the same time, any 
unification of the region would immediately produce harsh protests from those who, "fed up" with 
their experience with the CMEA, are unwilling to join a band wagon pattern in which the least 
developing country is determining the future and the integration maturity of the whole region. It is 
obvious that future Eastern enlargement, if it takes place, cannot be but gradual, both because of the 
rather different development level of the potential member countries and the highly different costs to 
be involved in enlargement of the individual countries. The economic requirements of modernizing 
Central and Eastern Europe cannot be financed at the same time on the same level even because of the 
financial limitations and the scope of virtual interests of Western Europe.  
 
The most important reasons, however, for an individual treatment can be found in the rather diverging 
starting conditions of the specific transforming countries. First, and probably most importantly, the 
collapse of socialism and Soviet domination resulted in the emergence of historically developed 
economic, political and civilization patterns across the region. This first fault line roughly draws 
between the Visegrád countries of Central Europe and the other transforming economies. Second, also 
the Visegrád countries have achieved different levels of macroeconomic stability and, more 
importantly, microeconomic maturity (as a good test, see the rather different behaviour of foreign 
direct investments in the region). Third, the political vulnerability and sensitivity of the individual 
countries differs a lot. For instance, Slovenia and the Czech Republic have completely different 
security problems than Poland. In turn, both Poland and Hungary have a much bigger role to play as an 
East-West and North-South transit country than most of the other CEECs. Also the share of sensitive 
products is different, with relatively high role of industrial goods in the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
and of agricultural commodities in Hungary or Poland. Due to the level of development measured in 
GDP per capita, the structure of production and the size of the country, the financial requirements to be 
met by the EU are highly diverging, with the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Slovenia 
representing the group of countries with the lowest level of potential support. In addition, also the 
nature of support differs with different levels of development, mainly at the microeconomic level (e.g. 
more investment-oriented support in Hungary vis-á-vis the priority of technical assistance in some 
other countries). 
 Considering this complicated situation, the Realpolitik of the EU should focus on three major issues.  
 
 
First, it has to provide a clear timetable of accession for each CEEC. A credible period of time should 
be identified within which all or most countries are expected to become members of the EU. Without 
specifying which country when is set to enter the Union, the definition of this time period does not 
produce any inconvenience either for the EU or for the CEECs.  
 
Second, any gradual Eastern enlargement, as a high probability alternative against bloc enlargement, 
has to keep the new external borders of the EU as open as possible. This is both in the interest of the 
EU and certainly a vital interest of the joining CEECs, particularly, if their accession to the EU would, 
at least temporarily, mean the "sacrificing" of strong ethnic and nationality linkages (large minorities 
living in not-yet-EU member countries). 
 
Third, any gradual Eastern enlargement should be preceded and accompanied by Brussels' regional 
support to the whole group of CEECs. This resource transfer should focus on regional infrastructure 
and the shaping of specialization patterns that can lay the ground for future intraindustry trade also 
among the CEECs. 
 
Although current arguments are in favour of individual treatment and of a gradual Eastern enlargement, 
several questions remain open and dependent on the partly unpredictable European dynamics. Based 
on experience with previous enlargements, both for political and administrative reasons, it is likely that 
also the next enlargement will simultaneously involve various countries. However, negotiations on 
membership conditions will be carried out strictly on bilateral level, between representatives of the 
Commission and the would-be member country. However, neither a (partial or total) bloc accession, 
under specific conditions, can be ruled out. This could be the case if the CEECs, as a region would be 
vitally threatened by developments in Russia and the Ukraine, and/or regional instabilities would 
strongly challenge the EU, in general, and its most powerful and, at least in security terms, most 
vulnerable country, Germany, in particular. Much less attention has been paid to the not fully unlikely 
development that a (partial) bloc accession will be forced out by different EU members in order to 
sustain the real or perceived internal balance of the enlarging Union. In this context, German economic, 
security and political interests in integrating Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary could be 




VII. Eastern enlargement and the future of European balance 
 
 
This issue, however, is leading us to the outstanding external factor affecting the chances of Eastern 
enlargement in the next years (or even in the next decade). 
 
The EU has been undergoing unique shifts in its internal and external balance-of-power pattern in the 
last years. Domestically, the French-German pillar had been the key stability and development factor 
of the integration, both in its periods of deepening and widening. French-German cooperation was 
needed not only in order to stabilize the integration process during some of its difficult stages 
(agricultural policy, monetary issues and exchange rate policies, industrial restructuring, budgetary and 
financial transfer framework, etc.) but also to provide the necessary impetus to push the integration 
undertaking forward (single market, political and military cooperation, Maastricht, etc.). In its external 
relations, potential French-German dissent remained rather limited by several factors. Primarily, the 
stable (or frozen) European balance of power pattern did not generate any major dispute among EU 
members, as the integration was considered a solid component of the post-1945/1948 global and 
European order. The security of Western Europe was adequately guaranteed by NATO. The EU's 
economic development was supported by achievements of the integration process, by strong, although 
slowly eroding transatlantic links, and by the global involvement of most national economies. 
Attempts at special ways in times of serious challenges (oil crises) or in the hope for rewarding business (oil and gas contracts with the ex-Soviet Union) could be managed after initial problems. In 
addition, Germany, although a key economic player, practised a high level of self-restrain in order to 
avoid even the appearance of any unique way to go (Alleingang). 
 
The spectacular changes on the map of Europe after 1989 have radically affected this "peace order". 
German unification in itself has shifted the internal balance of power of the EU, even if, in the first 
years and in economic terms, Germany became weaker and not stronger.  
 
The double challenge of having a stronger influence in the shaping of the future of the Union and of 
responding to the changing European structure has led the EFTA countries to apply for membership. 
Having made use of the short period of Russian paralysis, formerly neutral countries have swept aside 
all kinds of political reservations and rushed to become EU members at the first convenient time. This, 
however, has resulted in a different integration pattern. On the one hand, the geographic and economic 
(philosophy) balance of the EU has clearly shifted towards the East and the North. Although the net 
contributory position of the EFTA countries to the EU budget may temporarily hide this fundamental 
difference, one has to be aware of the longer term impact of this change. On the other hand, the EU has 
got two, equally important "mare nostrum". The Mediterranean lobby has been complemented by a 
Baltic lobby, with clear impact on the future of German politics, for Germany is a Baltic country but is 
not a Mediterranean one. At the same time, the struggle for the redistribution of EU resources has 
started between the old and the new semi-periphery of the EU core. Until now, the achievements of the 
new semi-periphery (CEECs) are less manifest in any major restructuring of the EU budget. 
Nevertheless, they are increasingly obvious in micro-level developments represented by changes in 
market shares and in the geographic orientation of international capital and technology. 
 
Association agreements with the CEECs have benefitted all EU countries, and, in some cases, 
Germany's relative share has been even decreasing in comparison with some EU countries. However, 
Germany's contribution to the structural modernization of the region, both by offering more 
competitive and open markets, by supplying more adequate commodities, and also by exporting direct 
capital to the region is unquestionable. The economic upswing in the new Bundesländer and the largely 
positive impact of tremendous investments in modern infrastructure will have a substantial spillover to 
some CEECs and will strengthen the modernization process in the associated countries of Central (and 
later also of Eastern) Europe. The political shift consisting in the reestablishment of Berlin as the 
capital of Germany will support this process. As a result, Germany's economic and political interests 
will be shifting towards the CEECs. More importantly and in contrast with most other EU countries, 
this shift is not only due to security reasons and a higher level of "damage limitation capabilities". On 
the contrary, this is a strong positive shift which is expected to make Germany the main beneficiary of 
the advantages the CEECs can offer. It is particularly this positive "expansion" and not "negative" 
security concerns which tend to strengthen the assumption that the unified Germany will not be 
tolerating for a long time to represent the Eastern border of the EU. Berlin itself will hardly accept to 
be located just 50 miles from the still dividing European border. 
 
The emergence of Islamic fundamentalism, a new threat in the Southern Mediterranean can exacerbate 
this shift even more in the next years. In comparison with a militant Islamic ideology, Central Europe 
shares all traditional Western values, and even Eastern Europe seems to be much closer to the Western 
way of life than the emerging Islam. One can predict a situation in which the EU will be virtually 
"sandwiched" between two major external challenges. It is by far not clear whether member countries 
will perceive these threats in the same way, and, it is even less clear, whether the shaping of a united 
European strategy will follow from this situation. 
 
At the moment, the strategic planning of the future of the EU does not go so far. Politicians are mostly 
engaged in trying to find adequate instruments to maintain the old internal equilibrium between France 
and Germany. Unfortunately, almost all concepts keep on moving within the old framework of "how to 
keep Germany down". These ideas might have worked under pre-1989 conditions, but they are not 
only unviable but sometimes virtually counterproductive in the nineties. 
 Mainly French plans have repeatedly insisted on binding the domestically changing Germany with a 
rapidly changing external environment into a traditional pattern of EU framework. For this purpose, 
France would be ready to sacrifice part of its sovereignty and tolerate the predominance of the German 
mark. The enforcement of Maastricht, a creation of the pre-1989 period, the "stability pact" conference 
designed by Balladur, political integration, several efforts to give priority to deepening against 
widening and the clear preference given to the Mediterranean area (partly with more German money, 
in other words a resource diversion from the CEECs towards francophone countries) are obvious 
elements of this endeavour. In most cases, Germany is not opposing this French effort. To some extent, 
it is even supporting it, as some elements of the rather controversial Schäuble paper indicate it. To be 
sure, at least as yet, there is no clear German message manifested on the highest political level that 
would take a substantially different position than that of France regarding the future of the EU. Most 
probably it would be unwise to threaten German-French relations, a cornerstone of European stability. 
It is, however, not less unwise to ignore the dynamics of European developments that could derail 
current cooperation patterns unless adequate answers will be found within a relatively short time. 
 
In my view, Germany's binding into Europe, a common interest of Western, Central and Eastern 
Europe, and not less that of Germany itself, urgently needs the binding of Germany's Eastern 
neighbours into the EU. This is the decisive issue which should lead the EU and its member countries 
in the shaping of integration strategies. In fact, the EU's agricultural and financial transfer problems or 
generally weak arguments for postponing the Eastern enlargement are likely to be dwarfed by this key 
element of the sustainability of European balance.  
 
Beyond the general(ly weak) arguments, two points have to be answered regarding this proposal. First, 
adversaries of such a plan may argue that Eastern enlargement would virtually consolidate already 
dominating German positions in the region. Second, any Eastern enlargement would definitely put 
Germany into a geographically central position in Europe. 
 
Concerning the first point, it has to be underlined that German influence is likely to be relatively more 
important without integrating CEECs into the EU. Austria's economic history from the sixties to the 
early nineties clearly shows this trend. (Interestingly, in the mid sixties France has vetoed Austrian 
membership in the EEC with exactly the same arguments.) The CEECs' membership in the EU would 
provide better opportunities for strengthening cooperation with other EU countries, attract more 
foreign investors, including from outside Germany and the EU, and, most importantly, introduce a 
strong political, legal and economic control imposed by institutions of the Union. 
 
The second argument is more difficult to be refuted. In fact, Germany will get a central geographic 
position in Europe, which is in accordance with changing realities on the continent and may hurt some 
Western European (mainly French) interests. If, however, this shift is adequately bound into the 
integration framework, most impacts could be favourable for European stability and cooperation, and 
compensate for eventual negative impacts. In consequence, a positive sum-game is easily attainable. In 
turn, Germany's prolonged "Eastern" position in the EU would create much more problems, without 
the positive impacts of integration. 
 
In a nutshell: two basic scenarios can be forecast. The first scenario does not consider early Eastern 
enlargement as a realistic alternative. The consequences would be growing instability, deepening 
economic gap and the heavy concentration of EU-CEECs relations on German-CEECs cooperation. As 
the direct neighbour to some CEECs, Germany would be forced to pay more attention and, ultimately, 
also to divert more resources to its Eastern neighbours. Simultaneously, German firms will be 
increasingly using the comparative advantage of shifting part of their production to low-cost 
transforming countries well endowed with skilled labour. The EU would be damaged in two ways. On 
the one hand, part of German resources, a major component of the EU budget will be diverted for 
damage limiting and stabilizing purposes. On the other hand, Germany, making more extensive use of 
competitive production factors in the CEECs, will emerge as a more competitive economy within the 
EU. Both elements are likely to generate developments which may substantially affect the intra-EU 
balance. 
 The second scenario is based on quick Eastern enlargement and Germany's binding into a larger 
European framework. Most probably, instabilities on Germany's Eastern border can be eliminated 
(even if partly shifted to the new Eastern border of the EU), available resources could be dedicated to 
economic modernization of the transforming countries and all EU members would benefit from the 
rapid development and high import demand of the CEECs. 
 
It has to be stressed that the choice between these two scenarios is not unlimited in time. The later the 
decision in favour of the second option will be taken, the lower will be the possibility of a stable and 
competitive European architecture based on the EU anchor. 
 
 
VIII. Concluding remarks 
 
 
The chain reaction of dramatic shifts in Europe did not come to an end with the collapse of the Warsaw 
Pact, the Soviet Union and of Eastern Germany. The process of political democratization and 
economic transformation in the CEECs is but one of the major elements of these changes. The EU is 
the obvious modernization anchor of the continent. However, it can play this role only if it can provide 
the right answers at the right time to the new challenges. Flight into earlier status quo attitude is 
definitely the wrong answer, even if it is described in "modern terms" (deepening, cautious 
enlargement if any, balancing between the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, all-European stability 
contract, etc.). Also the EU's pursuit for unilateral  
adjustment of the CEECs is untimely. A new European pattern providing a sufficient level of security 
and a high level of economic integration requires substantial adjustment efforts on both sides. 
Economic and political adjustment should be accompanied by a more positive communication strategy. 
This strategy should emphasize the positive results that can be expected from the Eastern enlargement 
and not the high costs, which hinder the geographic extension of the EU, or the relevant threats that 
may force the EU to widen the integration but for reasons of damage limitation exclusively. 
 
Beyond any doubt, gradual Eastern enlargement costs additional money, but much less than the 
financing of any non-membership alternative. Although the Association Agreements stipulate the 
creation of free trade in industrial products by the end of the century, and, thus, cope with the basic 
commercial interest of the EU. However, the market of the CEECs can only expand and offer 
sustainable dynamic demand for EU goods, if these economies recover, start a high, export- and 
investment-led growth, and will be able to finance their exploding trade deficit in the crucial years of 
economic modernization ("modernization deficit"). While Eastern enlargement is likely to enhance 
competition on Western European markets and increase pressure on the EU's industrial structure and 
labour markets, it can substantially contribute to higher levels of European competitiveness on the 
global scale. Both all-European restructuring and the integration of low-cost and highly-skilled labour 
into the international division of labour are expected to work in this direction. Finally, Western 
European stability and security cannot be sustained for a longer period without Eastern enlargement. 
The latter would not only provide a relevant support to a new security scheme but also strengthen 
European stability by creating a solid balance of power structure. 
 
Time and again, the author of this paper has been meeting with Western European arguments which 
qualify the scenario of rapid Eastern enlargement as an illusion. What is, however, the very illusion? Is 
it a forecast that tries to follow the dynamics of European developments, or the stubborn insistence on 
an outdated pattern of Western European status quo?  
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